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Introduction: Luhmann Encountered
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Anders la Cour Niklas Luhmann's (1927 -1998 theory of social systems is notorious for its degree of complexity and abstraction. It has been regularly misread as conservative, overly structural, positivist and disconnected from other contemporary theories; especially the ones influenced by post-structuralism, gender theory, postcolonialism, and spatial and embodied understandings of society. Such misunderstandings help to explain why, particularly in the English-speaking world, reception of Luhmann's work has been reluctant and uneven. While there is no paucity of introductions, general discussions and handbooks on Luhmann's work, some of the misattributions and ossified readings persist. Part of the problem is the lack of fruitful critical dialogues between Luhmann's theory and other theoretical perspectives that would manage to set Luhmann in a new light, away from received readings and originary orthodoxies, and in line with contemporary theoretical developments. 1 The present anthology is an attempt to establish precisely such connections by critically relating Luhmann's work to a set of other authors and theoretical perspectives -from Jacques Lacan to Jacques Derrida, from Gilles Deleuze to Umberto Eco, and from gender studies to actor-network theory to spatiality -all of which radically new and relevant areas of research to which Luhmann's theory has a great deal to contribute.
The need to bring systems theory into dialogue with other theoretical perspectives becomes palpable when one takes into account the fact that the theory has some serious comprehensive sociological and universal ambitions, in the sense 'that it deals with everything social and not just sections' (Luhmann, 1995: xlvii) . Indeed, one of the most significant difficulties is to accept both that the theory is universal and that it can never be all-inclusive, since it always leaves out the space from which the theory is observed: this is perhaps the fundamental paradox of the theory. The disconnection from other contemporary theories, therefore, can in part be explained by its paradoxically fragmented universality, and in part by its many counter-intuitive assertions that make it notoriously difficult to situate. This disconnection, system theorists, as well as scholars who engage in other theories or areas of contemporary sociological and ethical problematization who would like to see how either side of the encounter can be enriched. Just as other theories have and will continue to operate as stimuli for systems theory, we believe that systems theory has reached a level of maturity that enables it to function as stimulus for other theories as well. From the point of view of systems theory, other theories that exist in the environment of systems theory are observed as self-referential social systems in themselves: just as systems theory itself, they simultaneously combine self-reference with other-reference in order to create the necessarily structured form of theoretical complexity. Understandably, this process has generated a host of complex theories that combine a high degree of indifference with regards to their environment -an indifference that is, at the same time, the guarantee for a very specific openness and sensitivity towards it. Thus, the challenge of this volume: how to create an encounter between theories, whose closure is seen as the precondition for being open? This book is about establishing such possibilities for various theories to engage in interacting with each other.
We firmly believe that Luhmann's theory of social systems has something to offer not only to readers who are looking for a new theory to subscribe to, but also, significantly, to the ones who are looking to be intellectually challenged by new sources of inspiration within the particular field in which they are engaged. This kind of theoretical opening of systems theory required that the authors included in this volume were engaged in the specificities of systems theory. At the same time, however, contributors were required to keep a distance from it, thus attempting to transgress the limits of both systems theory and whatever other theoretical development they engage in, in order to push the thinking process further. Indeed, the volume devotes itself to exploring how systems theory can be developed internally, in order to be able to couple itself to other theories and develop new analytical strategies within different research fields.
Radical encounters
The idea behind the volume is rather simple: to provide for a space where encounters take place between Luhmann and systems theory/autopoiesis on the one hand, and other theorists and currents of thought on the other. This is by no means a neutral space between theories. Rather, it functions as a tool in order to deepen the understanding of Luhmann's work and at the same time enable other schools of thought to be brought into productive confluence with it. This does not preclude critical stances or indeed distances from systems theory. In fact, these were encouraged since we think that an encounter is not merely a meeting of ideas but rather a space of emergence, as Gilles Deleuze and F é lix Guattari would have it, which enables differential thinking on both encounter and encountered to be generated. However, the concept of encounter, seen now through an autopoietic lens, does not distinguish between encounter and encountered but allows the generation of spaces on both sides. We want to imagine these encounters as the preludes to potential structural couplings, namely shared but separate structures across systems that give rise to a certain predictability, closer observation and reciprocally induced creativity.
We begin with the common knowledge that Luhmann has shamelessly 'encountered' other theorists and integrated their thinking in his own systemic thought. What places this kind of encounter at a distance from traditional theoretical conversations between theorists across eras and spaces is that, in Luhmann, the encountered becomes absorbed and very nearly hidden from view. As a result there are numerous nods and waves and winks to a host of theorists in Luhmann's texts, yet their thoughts are not the usual platform of agreement or disagreement, as is the case with most theorists who enter a productive dialogue with other theorists, but a space of veritable emergence. The encounter in Luhmann becomes itself a performance of autopoiesis, dissimulating its production and presenting itself as always already part of the theory. It is in this sense that we have stumbled across the epithet 'radical' that preceded the encounters of the title. Apart from the obvious radicality of some encounters (for example, Luhmann and space, Luhmann and bioethics, Luhmann and Deleuze, Luhmann and Lacan) the term has been thought in its etymology as the condition without which the emergence cannot take place. 'Radical' comes from the Latin radix (gen. radicis ), which means root , the condition without which the flora cannot ever come to being. This is a gesture of appreciation to what Luhmann has been unfailingly doing in his writings, namely to employ encounters with other theories as the condition without which his own theory would not come about. However, this radicality is dissimulated, spread over the plane of autopoiesis, thus losing its origin and its original meaning. The movement goes from radix to ρίζα (rhiza, rhizome = root), namely from Latin back to Greek, and thus away from a sense of formal hierarchy and deeper into an acentral and horizontal diffusion of rooting. Luhmann's roots are spread underground like the root of grass, picking here and stopping there, yet managing to create a tight horizontality. Not unlike Derrida's or Deleuze's reading of other theorists, Luhmann's readings fluctuate between solid loyalty and productive 'misreading', namely an autopoietic, plastic reading that as soon as performed, is already part of the text in which it appears. In that sense, radical means both originary and non-originary, namely both the essential basis of it all and, at the same time, a refusal of its being the basis of it all. This is Luhmann's rather obvious but still effective 'cheating' (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011), in turn part of a grander scheme of paradoxification that only nominally succumbs to feeble attempts at de-paradoxification.
PROOF
In short, like a rhizome, this volume follows on Luhmann's radical encounters with other theories. We have tried to include concepts that we believe Luhmann would have integrated in his work today, such as materiality, psychoanalysis, gender, spatiality, even a revisiting of what the human is. We carry on with the embedded radicality of Luhmann's thought and with the help of our contributors, we hope to multiply these roots thus providing for more spaces of emergence and theoretical proliferation.
Luhmann observed
What we have encouraged here, therefore, is a less puritan, more eclectic approach to systems theory. This is very important if we are to open up new spaces within the theory's complex structure. The volume shows how this theory can challenge and be challenged by other theories, thus contributing to theoretical and empirical discussions within different domains that exist outside systems theory itself. This requires a reading that is both loyal and disloyal to the various theories. The readings are 'loyal' in the sense that they are faithful to the originality of the theory, but 'disloyal' in the sense that they transgress the boundary that the theory has set up for itself. This transgression, however, is not undertaken for its own sake. It is in each case performed in order to confront an important theoretical question that dominates a particular societal field, which at least according to a traditional reading, Luhmann has ignored or has nothing to contribute to. All the authors have engaged in the difficult task of opening systems theory up while maintaining their immersion in it. This is the task of autopoietic observation par excellence, namely the simultaneous immersion in and distance to the object of observation.
In this sense, the space of observation becomes also a space of critique: Luhmann observed is also Luhmann criticized. But from within, and while within, at a loving distance, if that were possible. This kind of positioning required that the authors were engaged in the specificities of systems theory. At the same time, however, contributors were required to keep a distance from it, thus attempting to transgress the limits of both systems theory and whatever other theoretical development they engage in, in order to push the thinking process further. Indeed, the volume devotes itself to exploring how systems theory can be developed internally, in order to be able to couple itself to other theories and develop new analytical strategies within different research fields. None of the authors is ready to 'overlook' Luhmann's indifference towards some of the most politically ardent issues of our time. Yet, such indifference is taken as a selection performed by Luhmann, rather than an Achillean omission that will bring the whole edifice down. In that sense, each author selects differently, observes differently and finally positions him or herself differently in relation not only to Luhmann, not even only to other contributing authors but even to some of the all important editorial desires. We could not have been happier of course. The proliferation of encounters has led to a proliferation of Luhmanns, and this is the only way to deal with this interminably complex yet all-inclusive theory, perhaps the last theory that manages to build itself on such a perilous and continuous use of the paradox yet never lose its sense of balance.
Consequently, it would be incompatible with the very idea of the book, if this introduction were structured as an attempt to establish a correct or uniform reading of Luhmann. Luhmann himself had on several occasions emphasized that systems theory is not a complete and finished theory, but it was up to the next generation of system thinkers to be engaged in its further development. This is exactly what we are trying to do. In this sense, the volume invites the reader to approach systems theory in an adventurous and even experimental way. For this reason, the reader will not find a consistent 'Luhmann' throughout the contributions to this book. Instead the volume represents the first opportunity for an encounter between several theories and areas of theoretical inquiry, benefiting from the contributions of some of the most distinguished Luhmann theorists that operate in a variety of thematic areas. Solidly interdisciplinary and with multiple methodologies, the volume has one unifying theme: that contemporary social challenges represent a level of complexity that force individual theories beyond their limits and into a space of intense, perhaps conflicting, but always productive exchange.
Enabling these encounters between Luhmann and other thinkers, therefore, has a number of advantages. First and rather obviously, it allows the theory to open up to a comprehensive dialogue with other theories. Second, it translates Luhmann's work into a less hermetic, self-referential language. Third, it allows the reader to become deeply engaged with the theory without however reducing her to a disciple who would contribute only to the internal coherence of systems theory. Instead, the whole volume manifestly shows the plethora of riches that are to be had if the traditionally closed systems theory circles open to encounters with other contemporary theories.
The encounters
In editing the various encounters between systems theory and other theories, we are reminded of an old tourist guide introduction to Paris. It reads, 'there exists no one Paris, but a variety of different Paris'. The sprawling megacity that is Luhmann's theory is not one city but an explosion of urban folds that come forth and take to hiding as the searching light of the various observers scan their skylines. The encounters take place at many different places within the theory of social systems, such as organizations, spatiality, corporeality, sensorial semantics, psychoanalysis, economy, biopolitics, gender, and politics. Some of these places are well trodden by anyone who PROOF has visited the theory before; others are places that even regular visitors or even permanent residents might not know existed. But the encounters are not only for people who already have an interest in systems theory. As already said, it is an invitation that addresses itself even to the ones without any affiliation to systems theory as such, since there do exist places worth visiting, and souvenirs to take back home wherever that might be.
The various encounters are arranged thematically in four parts: radical paradoxes, radical materiality, radical semantics, and radical politics. We understand the concept of 'radical', not so much in its contemporary sense, but in the sense outlined above as diffused and acentral. In this manner, we steer clear of wanting to express an orthodoxy of reading Luhmann or indeed of suggesting the right way in which the encounter is to take place. We have been painfully aware of the violence of clustering the texts in boxes that only partially describe their focus but we felt that this would help orientate the reader a little better. The clustering is not arbitrary. Each one represents a core aspect of the theory. The first theme on paradoxes is at the very heart of systems theory, in the form of the unity of a difference. But instead of being paralysed by the fact that the system cannot simultaneously observe the very distinction which makes the same observation possible, a system develops various kinds of processes of de-paradoxification that represent the very dynamic of the system (Luhmann, 1993 (Luhmann, , 1995 (Luhmann, , 1999a .
Thus, the first part of the book, Radical Paradoxes , begins with Jean Clam's continuing work on the paradox, this time bringing together Luhmann and Lacan. The paradox is shown to be at the heart of any theory of normative order. Luhmann and Lacan's insights into meaning and structure of this essential paradoxicality lead to the recognition of the co-originarity of Law and social communication. Indeed, any scheme of theoretical reconstruction of both concepts generates them in structural simultaneity. Much like Luhmann, Lacan situates the problem of normativity (of the symbolic order) not so much in the subsistence, the validity and the efficiency of the prescriptive body of the Law, but in its originating moment from factual, unquestionable, arbitrary violence. The old figure of the Father -ferocious and cruel -gave the one adequate view of the 'why' of castration (that is, of normative inflexibility and the rule of Owing (a price) for any actuation of desire). The emergence of an acute consciousness of a paradoxicality of the Law must then directly be linked to the fading of such a figure of arbitrary and violent origin. The paradox of Law holds then in a very compact formulation: The only symbol for an Auctorial Other at the origin of the Other is the figure of a castrating Father; when such a figure declines and recedes out of reach of the social discourses of legitimation of the Law, there can be no substitute for it at the depth of the Law; current deparadoxization of Law takes then the form of a current-processual diffraction of those kernels of meaning in which the question of the origin of the barring of jouissance is impenetratingly coagulated. William Rasch's 'Luhmann's Ontology', is a rather perverse title by admission of the author. While Luhmann explicitly claimed that his speculations were epistemological in nature, Rasch shows in his chapter that this is not necessarily incompatible with ontology. Instead he translates the question of ontology in Luhmann's work to the following question: how does reality return or rather remain as an ineradicable blind spot inaccessible to knowledge but in an unknowable way constitutive of it. Thus the title of the chapter is not a claim but simply a question: what status might an unknowable yet necessarily negentropic condition of possibility have in Luhmann's implied philosophy? And what might it mean to call the formulation of this condition of possibility, against Luhmann's own practice, Luhmann's ontology ? Rasch shows how the relationship between epistemology and ontology rests on a paradox. On the one hand, reflection in modernity has liberated itself from the role of the handmaiden of Being, and has assumed autonomous, even 'constructive' status. On the other hand, this seemingly paradoxical nature of contingently chosen starting positions gives to each of these initial distinctions its own autonomy.
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos's 'The Autopoietic Fold: Critical Autopoiesis between Luhmann and Deleuze' is an experimental text that targets the emergence beyond the paradox. The author continues here his work on Critical Autopoiesis but from a Deleuzian perspective. In the text, Deleuze's theories on the monad and the fold become co-extensive with Luhmann's understanding of closure and environment. The result is one that takes standard systemic notions, such as closure, system, environment, distinction, communication, function and so on, and indeed folds them into themselves in order to yield a torsion with a newly felt materiality. Beginning with Gottfried Leibniz's figure of the monad with its formula 'no windows', Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos sets the site of the paradox of the fold: a monad is 'an inside without outside', but the outside is folded within. The monad is filled with the folds of the outside, but it includes them in its closure and all its actions are internal. Although an internal doubling, the fold is not a reproduction of the Same but a repetition of the Different. It is not an emanation of an 'I', but something that places in immanence the material continuum between self and other. This monadic figure appears in Luhmann's work through the concepts of re-entry and autopoiesis expressed as the difference between system and environment. At the end, Luhmannian and Deleuzian concepts fold into each other, deeper into their immanence, and give rise to what Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos calls critical autopoiesis , namely an autopoiesis that is acentral, nomadic and thoroughly material. The concluding chapter of this part on radical paradoxes thus eases the reader into the materiality of the following section.
Radical materiality represents an important theme when observing systems theory, but for exactly the opposite reasons to those of paradoxes. In contrast to the question of paradox, materiality is not something that comes to mind when thinking about autopoiesis. The latter has been traditionally read as abstract and distant from material considerations. Indeed, Luhmann's main assertion that humans are excluded from society, except for being the thorniest issue, also blocks any consideration of materiality from entering the autopoietic boundary. Along with humans, autopoiesis turns its back to nature, buildings, space, and bodies. It has therefore become a traditional critique of systems theory, that materiality, whether it presents itself as mind, body or space, is being marginalized and delegated to the blind spot of the theory's observation of modernity. The criticisms rightly emphasize that by de-privileging these dimensions of modernity, the theory inevitably limits its own analytical capacities. This volume as a whole, and its section on Radical Materiality in particular, argues that it does not have to be this way. In continuing the previous chapter on material folds, Christine Weinbach's 'Gendering Luhmann: The Paradoxical Simultaneity of Gender Equality and Inequalit y ', questions the social status of gender in the functionally differentiated society. On the one hand, this society features universal criteria of inclusion into the different social systems; yet on the other, gender studies have revealed that these universal programmes are undermined by the autonomous logic of social levels such as organization or interaction. Luhmann's theory of social systems delivers an analytical framework for systematic considerations on this issue of the simultaneity of gendered and un-gendered expectations in social contexts. The horizontally functional differentiation in functional systems (for example, political, legal, and economic systems) and the vertical level differentiation of systems (functional system, organizational system, and interaction system) are co-evolving. Thus, organizations are located in functionally specified environments (for example, as political parties, banks, and courts), and organize the inclusion of their members into the particular function system both by providing functionally specified conditions of membership roles and by transforming the programme of inclusion of 'their' functional system in organization structures. In doing so, organizations establish the guidelines for the structure or functionally specified interaction and constitute the interactive environment. The chapter brings both strands together in order to show how the employment of Luhmann's systems theory can be fruitful to analyse the social critique emerging from gender studies and thus gain insights into the possibility of a gendered systems theory.
From gender inclusion to human inclusion at large, Todd Cesaratto's 'Luhmann, All Too Luhmann: Nietzsche, Luhmann and the Human' begins with Luhmann's ostensible lack of concern for the human and explains Luhmann's motivation by arguing that Luhmann's approach protects humanity from humanist theories and human-rights dogmas that instrumentalize and essentialize the human. Those passages in Luhmann's work that would seem, at the level of first-order observation, to exclude the human, can in fact be re-described as arguments for how we might more adequately understand the human in a functionally differentiated society. Not only does Luhmann present forms of the human implicitly, but alsocontra the received wisdom -explicitly, as couplings of mind, body, and social person that are more humble and more flexible than the forms found in most theories of the subject and subjectivity. This contribution makes the case that, even though Luhmann is reluctant to admit it, he knows that mind, body, and person -three parts contained in one vessel -do more than 'disturb, rouse, or irritate' each other. This emerges more clearly through an encounter between Nietzsche and Luhmann, which is the main focus of the chapter. The affinity manifests itself in rhetoric, argument, and narrative that evince a Nietzschean quality, which in turn reveals Luhmann to be caught in performative paradoxes where he is actually doing what he says we cannot do -that is, breaching system borders. Luhmann's rhetorical reserve and Nietzsche's rhetorical exuberance achieve the same effect: they attempt to overcome the values of their respective traditions in order to establish new, more adequate values in their shared tale of (devil's) advocacy for nobler forms of being human in a democratic modernity.
In 'Only Connect: Luhmann and Bioethics', Sharon Persaud takes Luhmann's work to the field of bioethics, thereby challenging both theory and empirical field. She sets as her case-study the new reproductive technologies and regulation in the United Kingdom of 'saviour siblings', where parents of a child with a serious medical disorder apply for permission to select a tissue-matched embryo for implantation in order to have a second child as a source of donor-compatible tissue. The first part of the chapter sketches some alternative Luhmannian reference points, with a reading of Luhmann's distinctive notions of technology, structural coupling, and morality and ethics. In particular, she suggests that structural coupling is key to Luhmann's narrative. The second part of the chapter is a reading of three very early ethical texts, written in the period immediately after saviour siblings became a practical medical possibility. Using the concepts set out in the first part, the reading explores what one can see through a Luhmannian lens. This includes how different systems (regulatory, bioethical, and medical) internalize and project 'the ethical,' and the consequence of different types of systemic reflections. The final section draws the strands together, and looks at how an attentive reading of Luhmann might enrich both ethical and sociological reflections on this and similar, distinctively modern and complex, issues.
The final chapter in the part brings in spatiality as a form of materiality that is often perceived absent from Luhmann. Christian Borch's 'Spatiality, Imitation, Immunisation: Luhmann and Sloterdijk on the Social' sheds some light on what might be called the politics of theory of the respective positions between Sloterdijk and Luhmann. This refers less to the ideological underpinnings of their theoretical architectures, and more to how specific analytical choices in the two theories foreclose particular kinds of PROOF observations of the social. What is, in other words, left in the dark? This is explored in four steps. First, the chapter demonstrates how the ambition of Sloterdijk's spheres project, namely to place spatiality centrally for the understanding of the social, stands in stark contrast to Luhmann's de-privileging of spatial matters. Second, the chapter examines how Sloterdijk's spatial analysis suggests that, contrary to what Luhmann holds, spatiality can impact communication. Third, the chapter focuses on imitation, which is attributed a key role in Sloterdijk's project. The chapter argues that the notion of imitation, too, challenges a fundamental idea in Luhmann because it demonstrates that communication might itself be conditioned by underlying dynamics. Fourth, the chapter suggests that Sloterdijk's spheres project is guided by a problematic emphasis on the need for immunization and that his analysis of contemporary spheres does not permit an observation of the kinds of immunization Luhmann identifies. The encounter between the two results is an emerging autopoietic spatiality and a spherological immunization thoroughly affected by autopoiesis.
While materiality is a traditionally marginalized aspect of Luhmann's theory, semantics is a standard field of analysis. Together with the concept of structure, semantics represents Luhmann's analytical strategy for conducting historical and empirical research. In his published series entitled Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik (Societal Structure and Semantics) Luhmann investigates how changes in semantics and structures influence each other and through various complex processes become the driving force in the development of society (Luhmann, 1980 (Luhmann, , 1981 (Luhmann, , 1989 (Luhmann, , 1999b . In contrast to many other, perhaps more insular concepts of systems theory, semantics have strong and readily obvious affiliations to concepts developed by other theories, notably discourse theory, history of ideas, cultural studies, and institutionalism. Semantics seems therefore the perfect locus for the kind of encounters facilitated in this volume. In the third part of the book called Radical Semantics , we attempt to give a different understanding of systemic semantics, one that emancipates the concepts and practices of interpretation, history, and intrasystemic semantic production from orthodox systemic readings. Elena Esposito's 'Limits of Interpretation, Closure of Communication. Umberto Eco and Niklas Luhmann Observing Texts' establishes an encounter between the two scholars that revolves around the central point of interpretation of interpretation: the idea that there is (or not) an outer limit that allows one to distinguish a priori correct readings from incorrect (or even 'aberrant') readings of a text. The chapter reconstructs the central role of the problems of interpretation in Eco's theory since the famous definition of the open work, which is actually much more a research on the conditions and the forms of closure. Eco's difficulty, one might say, is to manage a theory which includes at the same time 'open work' and 'aberrant decoding': the recognition of the multiplicity of interpretations and the possibility of establishing when this freedom of interpretation produces a sense too distant from the intentions of the sender. Luhmann's concept of communication is an indirect response to these difficulties, which dissolve when one takes as a reference the autopoiesis of communication. Communication constrains itself eliminating any arbitrariness, but maintaining the whole freedom of interpretation. The constraint does not depend a priori on the world or the text, but is produced a posteriori by the course of communication, accepting or rejecting what was understood before. Only communication constrains communication -not the sense intended by the author and not even the one intended by the recipient. Anders la Cour and Holger H ø jlund's 'Organisations, Institutions and Semantics: Systems Theory meets Institutionalism' brings Luhmann's concept of semantics and James G. March's and Johan P. Olsen's concept of institutions into an encounter. Both theories are engaged in discussions on how organizations of modern society develop and adjust themselves to the general development of society. The interplay between institutions, cultural semantics, and social structures becomes central in these discussions. The chapter shows, on the one hand, what sociological institutionalism can gain from a system theoretical understanding of the way in which semantics and structure establish a dynamic relationship that escapes any simple determinism between them; and, on the other, how the theory of sociological institutionalism on the emergence of institutions can in its turn inspire systems theory to free the concept of semantics from the iron cage of Luhmann's cogent but also limiting universe of functional systems. Luhmann has restricted his own research on semantics in the area of emergence of different kinds of functional systems. Focusing on these specific systems, however, meant that he neglected the many different forms of semantics that emerge outside and in between the boundaries of established systems. What this encounter brings forth is a reinvestigation and a need for reconceptualization of systemic semantics. Niels Å kerstroem Andersen's 'Conceptual History and the Diagnostics of the Present' carries on where the previous chapter stops, namely on the emergence of the semantic reservoir of the individual function systems, such as the semantics of politics, love, and art. The encounter between Luhmann and Reinhart Koselleck brings another path for the development of a semantic strategy where certainty regarding concept and semantic is precarious. The guiding idea is that the constitution of social systems and social forms is reflected in semantic development. Through Luhmann's sociologically informed conceptual history, Koselleck's guiding distinction between conceptual history and social history is replaced with a distinction between semantic and social structure. The latter is here interpreted as the form of communicative differentiation and structural coupling within society. Andersen suggests that Luhmann's concept of semantics can become more sensitive empirically and thus make itself more appropriate for the observation of contemporary semantic changes. As opposed PROOF to Koselleck, Andersen argues that, in principle, one can conduct a semantic historical analysis of any concept. Koselleck's work has contributed to the exploration of 'neu-zeit', namely conceptual transformations in the transition to the modern political order. The criterion for whether a concept was worth studying, therefore, was whether its transformation was constitutive for modern political concepts and categories. The encounter with Luhmann shows the potential and contingent relevance of any historical semantic analysis of any concept.
With this political statement, the volume moves on to its fourth and last part on Radical Politics . Luhmann's understanding of politics as representative of just one function system among others, without privileged status to observe the totality of society, remains a continuous inspiration for the observation of society's complexity and multicentrality. One of Luhmann's provocative observations is the powerless power of the political system. While the political system has the power to make collectively binding decisions, it has no power to determine what happens once its decisions have been made (Luhmann, 2000) . The last part of the volume deals with Luhmann's understanding of political communication, while bringing it into a productive confrontation with other theoretical perspectives regarding law, complexity, and freedom.
In 'Luhmann and Derrida: Autopoiesis and Immunology', Willis S. Guerra Filho discusses the impossibilities of a world society as constitutionally grounded. In Luhmann's concept of the world society, namely a systemically understood globalization characterized by hyper complexity and multicentrality, structural couplings between systems are instrumental. Guerra Filho focuses on the structural coupling between the legal and the political one and how they maintain their stability and growth in their environment simultaneously with each other yet independently of each other. The two are connected through a State Constitution, namely a particular medium of operative closeness. Constitutional Supreme Courts ultimately define what is to be seen as constitutionally grounded. These courts become then co-responsible with the operation of the binary code of both systems, that is to say, the lawful or non-lawful code in the case of legal system and the government or opposition in the case of political systems. This structure becomes significantly enriched when one reads Luhmann in combination with Derrida's concept of auto-immunity, a deconstructive sort of closure that is also an aporia. Through a careful reading of both theories, the chapter reaches nothing short of a paradigm shift that requires a new consideration of systemic violence in view of the manifest inability of politics to maintain the structures of society as promised.
The next chapter in this part discuss, in another vein, the impossibility to create a privileged position of ü ber observation from where everything can be observed in its totality. In 'In the Multiverse what is Real? Luhmann, Complexity and ANT', Barbara Mauthe and Thomas E. Webb examine whether it is possible to engage the theories of autopoiesis, complexity, and actor-network theory in dialogue. To do so, the authors challenge each approach and their individual understanding of reality as one that manages to capture the total reality. The authors contend instead that each theory offers only a partial account of the social and that by engaging the theories in dialogue the limitations of the respective approaches of each theory can be identified, creating the possibility for self-reflection in the light of the newly discovered viewpoints. The medium for achieving such a connection is the notion of the multiverse. The multiverse allows for the existence of numerous worlds where differences and similarities co-exist. There is not one reality but many, thereby facilitating its application in respect of Luhmannian autopoiesis, complexity, and ANT. There are similarities in terms of the origins of the theories and their underlying structural view, which is essentially systemic. The conclusion reached by the chapter questions whether it is appropriate for academics interested in systems theory to accept that there can only be one form of reality, that of Luhmannian autopoiesis. The chapter suggests that by reconceptualizing the understanding of the real, it becomes possible to question what the social represents, and how that representation is identified. The outcome is the inclusion of diversity extending beyond that of the singular universe represented by Luhmannian autopoeisis to include the multiverse represented by complexity, ANT, and Luhmannian autopoeisis.
The concluding chapter of the book is Chris Thornhill's 'Luhmann and Marx: Social Theory and Social Freedom', fittingly brings the discussion back to where the critique begun. Thornhill shows how Luhmann's work on politics shares vital common ground with Marx. This is reflected in Luhmann's theory of ideology, in his functional construction of human consciousness, in his systemic hostility to the metaphysical traces of humanism and voluntarism, in his rejection of anthropologistic patterns of societal explanation, and in his analysis of social systems as obtaining a high degree of apersonal autonomy in modern society. In fact, Luhmann's work can easily be read as a theory that places Marx at the beginnings of sociology, while at the same time attempting to think beyond and correct Marx by envisioning a systemic construction of society in which all human foundations for social meaning are stripped away, and in which the positing of original human causes for the formation of society is finally renounced. According to Luhmann, in binding society to a single ideal of freedom as human self-ownership Marx undermines the ability of his theory to understand society, and he forecloses the possibility that his theory might become sociologically adequate to the multiple meanings implied in the form of modern society. It is only by imagining society as comprising multiple freedoms, none of which can be made transparent to agents endowed with capacities for integral self-ownership, that sociology obtains access to its own object: society. For Luhmann, Marx stands at the origins of sociology -yet his PROOF vision of freedom prevents sociology from becoming sociology. Sociology is itself a mode of interpretive liberty, which frees action and understanding from simplified foundationalism, and it emerges, like all freedom, through an originary rejection of societal metaphysics.
Note
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